Control and communication in mental computationReport as inadecuate






Author: Richard P. Cooper

Source: https://core.ac.uk/


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Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the research output of Birkbeck College http:--eprints.bbk.ac.uk Cooper, Richard (2002).
Control and communication in mental computation. Computational Intelligence 18 (1) 29–31. This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Computational Intelligence (ISSN 0824-7935).
This version has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof corrections, published layout or pagination. All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual property law, including copyright law.
Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law.
Copyright © 2002, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com Citation for this version: Cooper, Richard (2002).
Control and communication in mental computation. London: Birkbeck ePrints.
Available at: http:--eprints.bbk.ac.uk-archive-00000550 Citation for the publisher’s version: Cooper, Richard (2002).
Control and communication in mental computation. Computational Intelligence 18 (1) 29–31. http:--eprints.bbk.ac.uk Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk Control and Communication in Mental Computation Richard Cooper R.Cooper@bbk.ac.uk School of Psychology, Birkbeck, University of London Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX United Kingdom Frawley is correct to stress the importance of control in cognitive processing, and the essence of his proposal — that disorders of cognition can result from either within-module or between-module breakdown — is an interesting and potentially important contribution to cognitive science.
However, Frawley’s commitment to an overly-literal interpretation of the computational metaphor, combined with his confusion over the possible relationship between any putative language of thought and modularity in peripheral versus central processes, distracts and detracts from his work.
In particular, mental processes can employ a language of thought without that language being in any way similar to standard functional or procedural programming languages.
In addition, communication between (peripheral) modules does not need to be bound by a single language.
Furthermore, the absence of a plausible computational system within which to demonstrate the logic-control distinction and its consequences for the language disorders under discussion weakens the within-module-betweenmodule argument. The computational metaphor — that the brain is like ....






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