'The good man is the measure of all things': objectivity without world-centredness in Aristotle's moral epistemologyReport as inadecuate

Author: Timothy Chappell

Source: https://core.ac.uk/


I begin by contrasting Aristotle's 'world-centred' general epistemology, and his 'mind-centred' (more exactly, 'agathos-centred�) moral epistemology.
I argue that Aristotle takes this approach, not because he doubts the objectivity of ethics, nor because he is an 'ethical particularist' (whatever one of those is), but because of the reflexive nature of ethics as a study.
I further argue that, by taking the notion that 'the good man is the measure of all things' as central to Aristotle's ethics, we can see how to unify coherently the rather embarrassingly diverse ethical resources that Aristotle offers us ...

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