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Editor: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Issued date: 2007-10

ISSN: 2340-5031

Serie-No.: UC3M Working papers. Economics07-41

Keywords: Disclosure , Imitation , Duplication , Exclusion , Sequential patent rights , Prior user rights

Rights: Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España

Abstract:It is an important concern that innovators by waiving their patent rights might obstruct thedisclosure of knowledge and therefore retard progress. This paper explores this concern byusing a simple model of two innovators who must decide sequentially whetheIt is an important concern that innovators by waiving their patent rights might obstruct thedisclosure of knowledge and therefore retard progress. This paper explores this concern byusing a simple model of two innovators who must decide sequentially whether to protect aninnovation with limited patent rights. Two features are crucial to the disclosure decision. First:the second inventor may use his valid patent right to exclude the first inventor from using asecret invention. Second: when waiving her patent right, the first inventor may disclose herknowledge outside of a patent. Disclosure informs the Patent Office and courts that relatedinventions from later inventors may lack novelty and hence should not be protected by validpatent rights. This paper shows that when the first inventor chooses not to patent the innovation,the amount of disclosure is related to the intellectual property choices in a paradoxical way: theamount of disclosure will be ‘large’ (‘small’) when the second inventor chooses secrecy(patenting) to protect the innovation too.+-





Author: Ponce, Carlos J.

Source: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es


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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Repositorio institucional e-Archivo http:--e-archivo.uc3m.es Departamento de Economía DE - Working Papers.
Economics.
WE 2007-10 More secrecy.
more knowledge disclosure? : On disclosure outside of patents Ponce, Carlos J. http:--hdl.handle.net-10016-1075 Descargado de e-Archivo, repositorio institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 07-72 Economic Series 41 October 2007 Departamento de Economía Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Calle Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe (Spain) Fax (34) 91 6249875 More Secrecy.More Knowledge Disclosure? On Disclosure Outside of Patents∗ Carlos J.
Ponce† Abstract It is an important concern that innovators by waiving their patent rights might obstruct the disclosure of knowledge and therefore retard progress.
This paper explores this concern by using a simple model of two innovators who must decide sequentially whether to protect an innovation with limited patent rights.
Two features are crucial to the disclosure decision.
First: the second inventor may use his valid patent right to exclude the first inventor from using a secret invention.
Second: when waiving her patent right, the first inventor may disclose her knowledge outside of a patent.
Disclosure informs the Patent Office and courts that related inventions from later inventors may lack novelty and hence should not be protected by valid patent rights.
This paper shows that when the first inventor chooses not to patent the innovation, the amount of disclosure is related to the intellectual property choices in a paradoxical way: the amount of disclosure will be ‘large’ (‘small’) when the second inventor chooses secrecy (patenting) to protect the innovation too. Keywords: Disclosure, Imitation, Duplication, Exclusion, Sequential Patent Rights, Prior User Rights. ∗ This paper was written while I was part of the Max Weber Programme at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
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