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Abstract

Sannikov 2007 investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem Theorem 2, contains an error in computing a Hessian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: The University of Tokyo-

Original Title: A Corrigendum to -Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time-

Language: English-

Keywords: repeated games; continuous time-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated GamesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-





Autor: Hashimoto, Tadashi

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18124/







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