Free Entry Bertrand Competition Reportar como inadecuado




Free Entry Bertrand Competition - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

Abstract

This paper examines Bertrand competition under free entry, when firm size vis-a-vis market size is exogenously given. A free entry Bertrand Nash equilibrium FEBE exists if and only if relative market size is sufficiently large. Further, there is a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium price that corresponds to the minimum FEBE price, leads to average cost pricing for all active firms and is decreasing in market size.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Free Entry Bertrand Competition-

Language: English-

Keywords: Bertrand competition; free entry; coalition-proof; contestability-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and DisequilibriumL - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise-





Autor: Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17837/







Documentos relacionados