Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Reportar como inadecuado




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Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to aless general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem-

Language: English-

Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations-





Autor: Weber, Tjark

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17836/







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