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Abstract

In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction-s reserve price and buy price, she does best to keep her aspirations sufficiently low by designing a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium. The seller is indifferent between the auction component of her mechanism being a first- or second-price auction.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low Enough-

Language: English-

Keywords: Auction; Aspiration; Buy price; Internet; Reference-dependence-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - AuctionsL - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer SoftwareC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-





Autor: Shunda, Nicholas

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16242/



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