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Abstract

The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the staticgame and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion-

English Title: An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion-

Language: English-

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Policy; Game Theory;-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic AnalysisC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesH - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance-





Author: Rosato, Antonio

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15084/







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