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Abstract

Uniform price auctions admit a continuum of collusive seeming equilibria due to bidders- market power. In this paper, I modify the auction rules in allowing the seller to ration strategic bidders in order to ensure small bidders- participation. I show that many of these -bad- equilibria disappear when strategic bidders do not know small bidders- willingness to pay. Moreover, when the seller is unconstrained in the quantity she can allocate to small bidders, the unique equilibrium price is the highest that the seller could get.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price Auctions-

English Title: Rationing as a Strategic Tool in Uniform Price Auctions-

Language: English-

Keywords: Uniform price Auctions, Treasury Auctions, IPO, Rationing-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - AuctionsG - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill-





Autor: Bourjade, Sylvain

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7260/







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