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Abstract

This paper measures that the Bank of Japan adopted the too-big-to-fail doctrine against the panic of 1927. The results at this paper imply that supported banks had higher closure risk or occupied key positions in the local loan-markets. And this paper finds that the Bank of Japan bailed out solvent banks if they had political importance.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya City University-

Original Title: Too Big to Fail: the Panic of 1927-

Language: English-

Keywords: lender of last resort LLR; too big to fail; the panic of 1927; bank closure-

Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and RegulationG - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; MortgagesN - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N25 - Asia including Middle East-





Autor: Yokoyama, Kazuki

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2768/







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