Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game Reportar como inadecuado




Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

Abstract

Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly BM of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage cooperative both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one competitive the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: Institute of Mining Engineering at Wroclaw University of Technology-

Original Title: Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game-

Language: English-

Keywords: bilateral monopoly; co-operative game; price negotiation; non-zero sum game; Pareto optimal solution; lignite price; power plant; lignite mine; pit optimisation; optimal ultimate pit; pit phases;-

Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market StructureD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: TheoryC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching TheoryD - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; CapacityL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsD - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; RevolutionsL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of FirmsL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; NetworksQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q31 - Demand and Supply ; PricesL - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable ResourcesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative GamesL - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities-





Autor: Jurdziak, Leszek

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/







Documentos relacionados