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Abstract

This paper extends Malik-s 1990 analysis to the case where criminals-avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals arestrategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegalbehaviours. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals- avoidanceefforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity ofsanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximalpossible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there mayexist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to lessarrestations of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the sametime, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: Beta, CNRS and Nancy University-

Original Title: Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics-

Language: English-

Keywords: deterrence; avoidance activities; optimal enforcement of law-

Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of LawK - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K40 - General-





Autor: Langlais, Eric

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1148/







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