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I introduce a property of player-s valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of potentially asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic content of what it takes to obtain efficient ex post equilibria.I generalize prior work by Echenique and Manelli 2006 and by Birulin and Izmalkov 2003. Relative to Krishna 2003, I weaken his single crossing properties, drop his differentiability and densities assumptions, but I assume that one player-s valuation is weakly increasing in other players- signals, while he uses a different assumption neither stronger nor weaker.

Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited-

Language: English-

Keywords: Efficiency; English Auctions; ex-post equilibrium-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - AuctionsD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-

Autor: Dubra, Juan


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