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Journal of Applied MathematicsVolume 2013 2013, Article ID 248968, 10 pages

Research ArticleDepartment of Mathematics, ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal

Received 26 July 2013; Accepted 21 October 2013

Academic Editor: Pu-yan Nie

Copyright © 2013 Luís Carvalho. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely, the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extrarobustness and albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes do not change.

Autor: Luís Carvalho



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