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1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods 2 Department of Computer Science, TU Darmstadt

Abstract : Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols - sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite msr rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a -low-level- specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol.

Autor: Steve Kremer - Robert Künnemann -



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