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Journal of Logic, Language and Information

pp 1–31

First Online: 20 May 2017DOI: 10.1007-s10849-017-9252-4

Cite this article as: Genot, E.J. & Jacot, J. J of Log Lang and Inf 2017. doi:10.1007-s10849-017-9252-4

Abstract

The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982 and Hintikka and Hintikka The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA eds Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983, is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic classical and intuitionistic.

KeywordsGame-theoretic semantics Dialogical logic 



Autor: Emmanuel J. Genot - Justine Jacot

Fuente: https://link.springer.com/







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