Slingshot Arguments and the Intensionality of IdentityReportar como inadecuado

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European journal of analytic philosophy, Vol.11 No.1 May 2016. -

It is argued that the slingshot argument does not soundly challenge the truth-maker correspondence theory of truth, by which at least some distinct true propositions are expected to have distinct truth- makers. Objections are presented to possible exact interpretations of the essential slingshot assumption, in which no fully acceptable reconstruction is discovered. A streamlined version of the slingshot is evaluated, in which explicit contradiction results, on the assumption that identity and nonidentity contexts are purely extensional relations, effectively establishing the intensionality of identity.

Davidson, Donald; extension, extensionality; intension, intensionality; Leibnizian identity conditions; logic; Neale, Stephen; propositions; semantics; sentence tokens and types; slingshot arguments; truth; truth-maker theory

Autor: Dale Jacquette -



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