Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard modelReportar como inadecuado




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1 CES - Centre d-économie de la Sorbonne 2 Economics Department

Abstract : This paper analyzes the interaction between migrants income and remittances and between remittancesand the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect informationabout the residents- real economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters- expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.

Keywords : Migrants Remittances Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Labour Supply Signaling Altruism





Autor: Claire Naiditch - Radu Vranceanu -

Fuente: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/



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