Stackelberg Game of Buyback Policy in Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer and a Risk-Averse Supplier Based on CVaRReportar como inadecuado




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This paper considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single supplier sells a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. We assume that the supplier and the retailer are both risk averse and utilize Conditional Value at Risk CVaR, a risk measure method which is popularized in financial risk management, to estimate their risk attitude. We establish a buyback policy model based on Stackelberg game theory under considering supply chain members- risk preference and get the expressions of the supplier-s optimal repurchase price and the retailer-s optimal order quantity which are compared with those under risk neutral case. Finally, a numerical example is applied to simulate that model and prove related conclusions.



Autor: Yanju Zhou, Qian Chen, Xiaohong Chen, Zongrun Wang

Fuente: http://plos.srce.hr/



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