Equilibria Immune to Deviations by Coalitions in Infinite Horizon Non-Cooperative GamesReportar como inadecuado




Equilibria Immune to Deviations by Coalitions in Infinite Horizon Non-Cooperative Games - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

Infinite horizondiscrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discountingof future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence andsustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not containthe last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution conceptfor them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. Itdoes not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it doesnot rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that thegrand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts ofrenegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss theconcept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviationsby all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of playerse.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitiveactivity, it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set ofsingle period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such acase, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficientway. In games with two levels of players e.g. members of two populations withsymbiotic relationship, while activities within each population arecompetitive, it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits ofall players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished butits distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of thepunishers.

 

KEYWORDS

Coalition, Discounting, Infinite Horizon, Pareto Efficiency, Populations of Players

Cite this paper

Horniaček, M. 2014 Equilibria Immune to Deviations by Coalitions in Infinite Horizon Non-Cooperative Games. Natural Science, 6, 1122-1127. doi: 10.4236-ns.2014.613100.





Autor: Milan Horniaček

Fuente: http://www.scirp.org/



DESCARGAR PDF




Documentos relacionados