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A scalarequilibrium SE is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form.When a decision criterion notion of rationality is either agreed upon by theplayers or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process ismodeled by a suitable scalar transformation utility function. Each n-tuple ofvon Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalarvalue between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determinesan SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much fasterthan Nash equilibria, for example; and the decision criterion need not be basedon the players’ selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromiseequilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing itto other solution concepts.


Game Theory, Equilibria, Scalar Equilibrium, Compromise Equilibrium, Scalar Transformation, Prescriptive Analysis

Cite this paper

Corley, H. , Charoensri, S. and Engsuwan, N. 2014 A Scalar Compromise Equilibrium for N-Person Prescriptive Games. Natural Science, 6, 1103-1107. doi: 10.4236-ns.2014.613098.

Autor: H. W. Corley, Surachai Charoensri, Narakorn Engsuwan

Fuente: http://www.scirp.org/


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