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Abstract: Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and havecommon knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, weproposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unawareplayers, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate forgames with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here,we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that have beenconsidered in the game-theory literature, with a focus on sequentialequilibrium. We also provide some insight into the notion of generalized Nashequilibrium by proving that it is closely related to the notion ofrationalizability when we restrict the analysis to games in normal form and nounawareness is involved.



Autor: Leandro C. Rego, Joseph Y. Halpern

Fuente: https://arxiv.org/







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