Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual gameReportar como inadecuado




Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

1 Department of Applied Mathematics Twente 2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d-analyse et de théorie économique

Abstract : In this article we consider Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form Chander and Tulkens 1997 in which any deviating coalition produces an output at a first period as a leader and outsiders simultaneously and independently play a quantity at a second period as followers. We assume that the inverse demand function is linear and that firms operate at constant but possibly distinct marginal costs. Generally speaking, for any TU-game we show that the 1-concavity property of its dual game is a necessary and sufficient condition under which the core of the initial game is non-empty and coincides with the set of imputations. The dual game of a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game is of great interest since it describes the marginal contribution of followers to join the grand coalition by turning leaders. The aim is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition which ensures that the dual game of a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game satisfies the 1-concavity property. Moreover, we prove that this condition depends on the heterogeneity of firms- marginal costs, i.e., the dual game is 1-concave if and only if firms- marginal costs are not too heterogeneous. This last result extends Marini and Currarini-s core non-emptiness result 2003 for oligopoly situations.

Keywords : Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game Dual game 1-concavity





Autor: Theo Driessen - Dongshuang Hou - Aymeric Lardon -

Fuente: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/



DESCARGAR PDF




Documentos relacionados