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1 CES - Centre d-économie de la Sorbonne

Abstract : We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bar-gaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction. This solution is simple, micro-founded and permits a transparent analysis of the driv-ing forces of wages. We argue that it can be used in a wide range of economic models incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to simplify the anal-ysis and obtain more easily interpretable results.

Keywords : search and matching models credible bargaining wage rigidity

Autor: Vincent Boitier - Antoine Lepetit -



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