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Publisher: IEEE

Issued date: 2013-02

Citation: IEEE Communications Letters, February 2013, 172, pp. 428 - 431

ISSN: 1089-7798

DOI: 10.1109-LCOMM.2013.011113.122220

Sponsor: This work has beenpartially supported by the EU FP7 TREND project 257740, the SpanishT2C2 project TIN2008-06739-C04-01 and the Madrid MEDIANET projectS-2009-TIC-1468.European Communitys Seventh Framework Program

Publisher version: http:-dx.doi.org-10.1109-LCOMM.2013.011113.122220

Project: info:eu-repo-grantAgreement-EC-FP7-257740Comunidad de Madrid. S2009-TIC-1468-MEDIANET

Keywords: Chord , Distributed Hash Table DHT , Kademlia , P2PSIP , Resource Location and Discovery RELOAD , Sybil resource attack.

Abstract:The Sybil attack is one of the most harmful security threats for distributed hash tables DHTs. This attack is not only a theoretical one, but it has been spotted -in the wild-, and even performed by researchers themselves to demonstrate its feasibility. In tThe Sybil attack is one of the most harmful security threats for distributed hash tables DHTs. This attack is not only a theoretical one, but it has been spotted -in the wild-, and even performed by researchers themselves to demonstrate its feasibility. In this letter we analyse the Sybil attack whose objective is that the targeted resource cannot be accessed by any user of a Chord DHT, by replacing all the replica nodes that store it with sybils. In particular, we propose a simple, yet complete model that provides the number of random node-IDs that an attacker would need to generate in order to succeed with certain probability. Therefore, our model enables to quantify the cost of performing a Sybil resource attack on RELOAD-Chord DHTs more accurately than previous works, and thus establishes the basis to measure the effectiveness of different solutions proposed in the literature to prevent or mitigate Sybil attacks.+-





Autor: Urueña, Manuel; Cuevas, Rubén; Cuevas, Ángel; Banchs, Albert

Fuente: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es


Introducción



Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Repositorio institucional e-Archivo http:--e-archivo.uc3m.es Colecciones multidisciplinares DIT - RYSC - Artículos en Revistas Internacionales - International Journals 2013-02 A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD-Chord Resources Urueña, Manuel IEEE IEEE Communications Letters, February 2013, 17(2), pp.
428 - 431 http:--hdl.handle.net-10016-18094 Descargado de e-Archivo, repositorio institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid This document is published in: IEEE Communications Letters, February 2013, 17(2), pp.
428 - 431. DOI: 10.1109-LCOMM.2013.011113.122220 © 2013 IEEE.
Personal use of this material is permitted.
Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting-republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD-Chord Resources Manuel Urueña, Member, IEEE, Rubén Cuevas, Member, IEEE, Ángel Cuevas, Member, IEEE and Albert Banchs Member, IEEE Abstract—The Sybil attack is one of the most harmful security threats for distributed hash tables (DHTs).
This attack is not only a theoretical one, but it has been spotted “in the wild”, and even performed by researchers themselves to demonstrate its feasibility.
In this letter we analyse the Sybil attack whose objective is that the targeted resource cannot be accessed by any user of a Chord DHT, by replacing all the replica nodes that store it with sybils.
In particular, we propose a simple, yet complete model that provides the number of random node-IDs that an attacker would need to generate in order to succeed with certain probability.
Therefore, our model enables to quantify the cost of performing a Sybil resource attack on RELOAD-Chord DHTs...





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