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 Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks


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This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users SUs via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access DSA, we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operators pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operators single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users PUs traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.



Autor: Nguyen H. Tran; Choong Seon Hong; Sungwon Lee; Zhu Han

Fuente: https://archive.org/







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