Inter-Operator Spectrum Sharing from a Game Theoretical PerspectiveReport as inadecuate

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EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing

, 2009:295739

Dynamic Spectrum Access for Wireless Networking


We address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium NE. Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. Then, in a cognitive context with the presence of primary and secondary operators, the inter-operator spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg game using hierarchy where the primary operator is the leader. The Stackelberg Equilibrium SE is reached where the best response of the secondary operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary operator-s utility function. Moreover, an extension to the multiple operators spectrum sharing problem is given. It is shown that the Stackelberg approach yields better payoffs for operators compared to the classical water-filling approach. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to the centralized approach.

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Author: Mehdi Bennis - Samson Lasaulce - Merouane Debbah


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