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Abstract: The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume the proximitybetween readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel.However, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between the prover tagand the verifier reader and trick this last one into thinking that the proveris in close proximity. This attack is generally known as a relay attack inwhich scope distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks are included.Distance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinderrelay attacks. Several protocols have been proposed during the last years butvulnerabilities of major or minor relevance have been identified in most ofthem. In 2008, Kim et al. 1 proposed a new distance bounding protocol withthe objective of being the best in terms of security, privacy, tagcomputational overhead and fault tolerance. In this paper, we analyze thisprotocol and we present a passive full disclosure attack, which allows anadversary to discover the long-term secret key of the tag. The presented attackis very relevant, since no security objectives are met in Kim et al.-sprotocol. Then, design guidelines are introduced with the aim of facilitatingprotocol designers the stimulating task of designing secure and efficientschemes against relay attacks. Finally a new protocol, named Hitomi andinspired by 1, is designed conforming the guidelines proposed previously.



Autor: Pedro Peris-Lopez, Julio C. Hernandez-Castro, Christos Dimitrakakis, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Juan M. E. Tapiador

Fuente: https://arxiv.org/



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