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Abstract: The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies oncooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, andsocial dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals- fitness, usually the basicdriving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolutionis also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitnessdifferences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigatethe effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studyingthe mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive tofluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging -edge of neutralevolution- that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Ourresults reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutralregimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory,where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Ourstudies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way topartly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable toestimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.



Autor: Jonas Cremer, Tobias Reichenbach, Erwin Frey

Fuente: https://arxiv.org/



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