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THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2009, 24 2

Autor: XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ

Fuente: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730809006


Introducción



THEORIA.
Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia ISSN: 0495-4548 theoria@ehu.es Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea España DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ, XAVIER Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism THEORIA.
Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, vol.
24, núm.
2, 2009, pp.
213225 Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea Donostia-San Sebastián, España Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=339730809006 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ BIBLID [0495-4548 (2009) 24: 65; pp.
213-225] ABSTRACT: Goodman’s style may be elusive sometimes, so that it may result difficult to interpret what he really has in mind.
This is a consequence of his masterful use of irony and metaphorical language.
This difficulty of interpretation affects important parts of his philosophical thoughts and had led to misunderstandings.
In the present article, I discuss the significance of Goodman’s pluralism, one of his most relevant theses.
I try to show that Goodman’s pluralism does not lead to skepticism or the relativism of “anything goes”.
One of the most common arguments directed against Goodman’s pluralism is that his attempt to provide a genuine standard of “rightness” fails, leaving us without a conception of truth or an appropriate substitute.
I will argue that the conclusion of this argument is false, trying to show that Goodman’s aim of defending an irrealist pluralism is perfectly coherent and defensible against the common interpretation of his critics. Keywords: Nelson Goodman, relativism, plur...





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