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Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 2009, 36

Author: William Grundy

Source: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323028512011


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Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía ISSN: 0188-6649 kgonzale@up.edu.mx Universidad Panamericana México Grundy, William DELIBERATION AND TWO CONCEPTS OF MIND: A RESPONSE TO MARTIN SEEL Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, núm.
36, 2009, pp.
161-170 Universidad Panamericana Distrito Federal, México Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=323028512011 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative “grundy” — 2009-11-6 — 20:13 — page 161 — #161 D ELIBERATION AND T WO C ONCEPTS OF M IND : A R ESPONSE TO M ARTIN S EEL* William Grundy Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas, UNAM wpgrundy@cantab.net Abstract The author considers the concept of deliberation as developed by Professor Martin Seel, and he tries to extract from that concept an underlying picture of mind.
The author describes two pictures of mind that are historically and philosophically opposed.
The first makes a sharp distinction between subject and object, and it construes experience in essentially epistemological terms.
The second avoids sharp distinctions between subject and object, or between mind and world, and it construes experience in essentially practical terms.
The author argues that there is significant evidence of both pictures in Professor Seel’s discussion of deliberation. Key Words: mind, subjectivity, Deliberation, Kant, Wittgenstein. Resumen El autor considera el concepto de deliberación, como el profesor Martin Seel lo desarrolla, e intenta extraer de ese concepto un modelo subyacente de la mente.
Describe dos modelos de la mente que son históricamente y filosóficamente opuestos.
El primero pone una distinción fuerte entre el sujeto y el objeto e interpreta experiencia en términos principalmente epistemológicos.
El segundo e...





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