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Jorge Ornelas ;Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 2013, 44

Author: Armando Cíntora

Source: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323028517001


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Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía ISSN: 0188-6649 kgonzale@up.edu.mx Universidad Panamericana México Cíntora, Armando; Ornelas, Jorge Trading one Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams’ Criticism of Agrippan Scepticism Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, núm.
44, 2013, pp.
9-34 Universidad Panamericana Distrito Federal, México Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=323028517001 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Trading one Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams’ Criticism of Agrippan Scepticism Armando Cíntora y Jorge Ornelas Departamento de Filosofía, UAM-I cintora1@prodigy.net.mx jornelass@gmail.com Abstract M.
Williams’ analysis (1999, 2001 and 2004b) of the Prior Grounding Conception (PGC) of epistemic justification —a conception allegedly behind the Agrippan trilemma— is reviewed and it is contrasted with the Default Challenge Conception of justification (DChC) —the alternative conception of epistemic justification championed by Williams.
It is argued that the epistemic default entitlements of the DChC are a euphemism for epistemically arbitrary stipulations, it is also argued that while the PGC might lead to sceptical paradoxes, the DChC leads to a paradoxical pancriticism, and that which of these two paradoxes to prefer will be a matter of taste or temperament.
Finally it is argued that the DChC is neither an adequate description of our philosophical, nor, it seems, of our ordinary epistemic practice.
It is then concluded that the PGC is the superior conception, even if it might lead to a Pyrrhonian attitude towards the absolute presuppositions of science.
We conclude by openly arguing in favour a type of non-epistemic dogmatism with Pyrrhonian implications...





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