Optimal Policies for Sin Goods and Health Care: Tax or Subsidy Reportar como inadecuado




Optimal Policies for Sin Goods and Health Care: Tax or Subsidy - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

Abstract

In this paper we examine the optimal policies for sin goods and health care in a two-period economy. Individuals are myopic in the sense that they undervalue the utilities of future consumption and health quality. When investing in health care in the second period, individuals who have previously made myopic decisions may persist in their shortsighted consumption plans persistent error or recognize their mistakes dual self. We show that, for persistent-error myopes, the first-best policy mix requires a subsidy on savings and a tax on sin goods. The health care should be taxed subsidized if the degree of myopia concerning future consumption is larger smaller than that concerning health quality. For dual-self myopes, the optimal policy for sin goods can be either a tax or a subsidy, depending on the relative degrees of myopia and the property of the health quality function.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Optimal Policies for Sin Goods and Health Care: Tax or Subsidy?-

Language: English-

Keywords: sin goods; health care; myopic behaviors-

Subjects: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal TaxationI - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health-





Autor: Cheng, Chu-Chuan

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80183/







Documentos relacionados