Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs Reportar como inadecuado

Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.


We present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non-enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging, and show that these intermediate costs induce second-best optimal outcomes.

Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs-

Language: English-

Keywords: Promises, lying costs, joint projects, input games, partnerships.-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated GamesD - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles-

Autor: Heller, Yuval


Documentos relacionados