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Abstract

In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals 1 and 2 who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i≠j, in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first second nation, arranged marriages are uncommon common and hence it is relatively difficult straightforward for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis-

English Title: Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis-

Language: English-

Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Net Utility, Static Game, Strategic Complements-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold AllocationJ - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse-





Autor: Batabyal, Amitrajeet

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74745/







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