Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance PoolReportar como inadecuado

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

1 CES - Centre d-économie de la Sorbonne 2 PSE - Paris School of Economics 3 CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations 4 CIRANO 5 UM - Université du Maine 6 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d-analyse et de théorie économique

Abstract : We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the ag-gregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the ex ante efficiency of equal and contribution-based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no-insurance equilibrium while contribution-based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a \dual interior equilibrium-. That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co-existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes risk tolerance vs risk aversion which is natural in a risky context.

Keywords : mutual-aid games

Autor: Louis Lévy-Garboua - Claude Montmarquette - Jonathan Vaksmann - Marie-Claire Villeval -

Fuente: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/


Documentos relacionados