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Abstract

We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Moreover, we also show that justified objections equate with Walrasian objections. Our bargaining-Walras equivalence provides a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell 1989 for continuum economies.Some further results highlight whether it is possible to restrict the formation of coalitions and still get the bargaining set. Finally, recasting some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: A bargaining-Walras approach for finite economies-

English Title: A bargaining-Walras approach for finite economies-

Language: English-

Keywords: Bargaining sets, coalitions, core, veto mechanism.-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D00 - GeneralD - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: TheoryD - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies-





Autor: Hervés-Estévez, Javier

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69802/







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