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Abstract

This article compares and contrasts the approach to merger issues in vertical and conglomerate cases including likely efficiencies, useful data, and the approach to looking at each of ability, incentive, and effect in turn. The paper considers when conglomerate mergers are more likely to mirror vertical cases and result in static price rises. The article considers the relationship between conglomerate foreclosure and predatory pricing to determine whether merger analysis is the most suitable place to intervene and stop short-term benefits that may harm competition in the longer term. Finally, potential amendments to the existing framework are discussed.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure-

Language: English-

Keywords: Conglomerate merger vertical foreclosure competition price discrimination-

Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and PoliciesL - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations-





Autor: Proctor, Adrian

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68137/







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