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The Scientific World Journal - Volume20142014, Article ID961394, 14 pages -

Research Article

Sino-US Global Logistics Institute, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China

Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, China

School of Business Administration, Contemporary Business and Trade Research Center, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Zheshang Research Center, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received 20 January 2014; Accepted 23 May 2014; Published 18 June 2014

Academic Editor: FranciscoChicano

Copyright 2014 Guanghua Han et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

This paper studies the trust issue in a two-echelon supply chain information sharing process. In a supply chain, the retailer reports the forecasted demand to the supplier. Traditionally, the suppliers trust in the retailers reported information is based on the retailers reputation. However, this paper considers that trust is random and is also affected by the reputation and the demand gap. The supplier and retailer have been shown to have different evaluations regarding the degree of trust. Furthermore, distrust is inherently linked to perceived risk. To mitigate perceived risk, a two-stage decision process with an unpayback deposit contract is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and the retailer negotiate the deposit contract. At the second stage, a Stackelberg game is used to determine the retailers reported demand and the suppliers production quantity. We show that the deposits from the retailers and suppliers perspectives are different. When the retailers reported demand is equal to the suppliers forecasted demand, the retailers evaluation of the deposit is more than that of suppliers. When the retailers reported demand is equal to the retailers forecasted demand, the deposit from the retailers perspective is at the lowest level.





Autor: Guanghua Han,Ming Dong,and Qi Sun

Fuente: https://www.hindawi.com/



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