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Abstract

This paper aims to theoretically clarify the following two points.
First, even though the government shows favoritism toward the poor and wants to exempt low-income taxpayers and secure its necessary income tax revenue by taxing only high-income taxpayers, the government ends up taxing the poor, which is in opposition to favoritism, due to its inability to observe individual taxpayers-income levels.
Second, even without observing each taxpayers- income level, if favoritism is sufficiently strong, the government can discontinuously resolvesuch unintentional taxation.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Favoritism toward the Poor and a Discontinuous Tax Structure-

English Title: Favoritism toward the Poor and a Discontinuous Tax Structure-

Language: English-

Keywords: Favoritism, Optimal income taxation, Tax evasion, Nashequilibrium.-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignH - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal TaxationH - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance-





Autor: Sato, Hideki

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66945/



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