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Abstract

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock 1980 and Lazear and Rosen 1981. Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the equilibrium effort of the shared-prize contest approaches that of a Tullock lottery contest.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize-

Language: English-

Keywords: Contests, All-pay auctions, Tournaments, Random noise, Shared prize-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesD - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorD - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions-





Autor: Sheremeta, Roman

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58271/







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