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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among children are expected under perfect information, while the second-best contract implies risk-sharing between the two generations, so that poor families experience higher agency costs, therefore inequality persists.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: A theory of family education incentives and inequality-

Language: English-

Keywords: Asymmetric information, Family ,Education, Incentives, Transfers, Inequality.-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: TheoryI - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I21 - Analysis of EducationI - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I22 - Educational Finance ; Financial AidI - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I24 - Education and InequalityJ - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic EconomicsJ - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth-





Autor: Jellal, Mohamed

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57913/







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