Are Behaviours in the 11-20 Game Well Explained by the level-k Model Report as inadecuate

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We investigate whether behaviours in Arad and Rubinstein 2012 11-20 game are well explained by the level-k model. We replicate their game in our Baseline experiment and provided two other variations that retain the same mixed-strategy equilibrium but result in different predicted level-k behaviours. Our hypothesis test is motivated by the logic that if the Baseline and variation games capture level-k reasoning behaviours, we should find consistent proportion of level-k types in all games. We considered two types of level-k models where players were assumed to best respond stochastically and found that the level-k models were able to explain the data significantly better than the equilibrium driven alternatives. In addition, the level-k models were also able to demonstrate consistent proportions of level-k types between the differentiated games. Our findings provide support for Arad and Rubinstein 2012 assertion that behaviours in the 11-20 game can be attributed to the level-k models.

Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Are Behaviours in the -11-20- Game Well Explained by the level-k Model?-

Language: English-

Keywords: k-level, Cognitive Hierarchy, Quantal Response Equilibrium, 11-20 money request game-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated GamesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior-

Author: Choo, Lawrence C.Y


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