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Abstract

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-periodtiming game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixedstrategies that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock 1992 from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata-s 2009 recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies-

English Title: Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies-

Language: English-

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth, price leadership, oligopoly, timing games-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets-





Autor: Tasnádi, Attila

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47610/



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