Gossip NoC - Avoiding Timing Side-Channel Attacks through Traffic ManagementReportar como inadecuado




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1 PPGC - II 2 LHC - Laboratoire Hubert Curien Saint Etienne 3 TUM - Technical University Munich Munich

Abstract : —The wide use of Multi-processing systems-on-chip MPSoCs in embedded systems and the trend to increase the integration between devices have turned these systems vulnerable to attacks. Malicious software executed on compromised IP may become a serious security problem. By snooping the traffic exchanged through the Network-on-chip NoC, it is possible to infer sensitive information such as secrets keys. NoCs are vulnerable to side channel attacks that exploit traffic interference as timing channels. When multiple IP cores are infected, they can work coordinately to implement a distributed timing attack DTA. In this work we present for the first time the execution of a DTA and a secure enhanced NoC architecture able to avoid the timing attacks. Results show that our NoC proposal can avoid the DTA with an increase of only 1% in area and 0.8% in power regarding the whole chip design.

Keywords : Network-on-Chip Security NoC Timing Attack Timing Side-channel Attack





Autor: Cezar Reinbrecht - Altamiro Susin - Lilian Bossuet - Johanna Sepúlveda -

Fuente: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/



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