The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence Reportar como inadecuado

The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.


This article reports the results of a laboratory experiment that examines the strategic effect of forward contracts on market power in infinitely repeated duopolies. Two competing effects motivate the experimental design. Allaz and Vila 1993 argue that forward markets act like additional competitors in that they increase quantity competition among firms. Conversely, Liski and Montero 2006 argue that forward contracting can facilitate collusive outcomes by enabling firms to soften competition. The experiment provides a first simultaneous test of these rival effects. Contrary to previous experimental studies, the results do not support the quantity-competition effect. Further, the findings provide evidence in support of the collusive hypothesis.

Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence-

Language: English-

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly, Collusion, Experiments, Forward markets, Electricity markets-

Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q49 - OtherD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual BehaviorC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-

Autor: Schubert, Jens


Documentos relacionados