Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called -take-or-give auction.- Unlike in basic auction, the take-or-give auction imposes new rules which the bidders compete for their desired allocation of the object. The auction solves the free-rider problem when applied to an object with countervailing-positive externalities. It is efficient. Moreover, by adding more rules including entry-fee rule, no sale condition and pooling rule, the extended take-or-give auction is the revenue-maximizing auction.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities-

Language: English-

Keywords: Auction design, positive externalities, countervailing-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - OtherD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions-





Author: Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43609/







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