Free-Riding and Performance in Collaborative and Non-Collaborative Groups Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Individuals bring effort to a group to achieve a common objective. Group membership introduces a free riding incentive, reducing effort, as well as a social responsibility incentive, increasing effort. This paper shows that the free riding effect is stronger. Individuals significantly reduce their effort as the difficulty of the task increases when they cannot collaborate in the group. Once collaboration is allowed, the negative effects of free riding are not observed. Collaborating groups outperform both groups without collaboration and individuals. They do as well as the best constituent member would have done on her own, thus aggregating existing knowledge.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Free-Riding and Performance in Collaborative and Non-Collaborative Groups-

Language: English-

Keywords: group behavior, decision making, free-riding, experiments-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; AssociationsC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group BehaviorZ - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification-





Author: Besedes, Tibor

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33948/







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