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Abstract

Economists and other applied researchers use game theory to study industrial organization, financial markets, and the theory of the firm. In an earlier article in the Mathematica Journal, Dickhaut and Kaplan 1991 present a procedure for solving two-person games of complete information. In many applications, however -asymmetric information- is a central issue. By asymmetric information, we mean that one party has access to information that the other party lacks. The branch of game theory that deals with this problem is known as -games of incomplete information-; the formal model is discussed in Harsanyi 1967. Myerson 1991, Tirole 1989 et al, discuss the applications but do not focus on computational procedures. We provide, in this article, an application of Mathematica to games of incomplete information that should be of interest for two reasons: i as a basis for thinking about solutions to games of incomplete information, and ii as an approach to understanding the particular application presented here, namely, the effect of strategic information transmission in firms and markets.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Strategic information transmission: a mathematica tool for analysis-

Language: English-

Keywords: Mathematica; Strategic Information Transmission; Crawford Sobel Model;-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-





Autor: Dickhaut, John

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33869/







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