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Abstract

Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that all-pay auctions still earn more money than first-price auction. Thus, all-pay auctions should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Charitable asymmetric bidders-

Language: English-

Keywords: All-pay auctions, Charity, Externalities-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - ExternalitiesD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - AuctionsD - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy-





Autor: Olivier, Bos

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31877/







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